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1. Introduction
Financial analysts’ forecasting process is sometimes described as a “black box” in the 
literature and other than a survey (Brown et. al., 2015) very few insights can be gained about the 
forecasting process. Therefore, it is even more important to investigate the properties of the 
analysts’ forecasts to calibrate how they capture market information and how the market captures 
their information. It is generally accepted that a rich information environment and low information 
asymmetry between management, financial intermediaries, and investors have beneficial effects 
on the efficient functioning of capital markets.  The benefits typically include efficient pricing, 
better earnings forecasts, increased liquidity and beneficial effects on risk factors such as 
uncertainty about firm value, cost of capital and the volatility of future stock returns (see Diamond 
and Verrecchia (1991), Healy and Palepu (2001), Easley and O’Hara (2004), Liu and Wysocki 
(2008), Kothari et al. (2009), Rogers et al. (2009), Billings et. al. (2015) among others). 
Increasingly, analysts’ earnings forecasts are becoming a major source of new information for 
market participants (Brown and Caylor (2006)). In particular, an analyst forecast revision 
introduces two salient pieces of information, the news content (good vs. bad) which changes 
expectations of future cash flows and the change in dispersion of analysts’ forecasts (Barron et al. 
1998, Kothari et al. (2001) which has been linked to uncertainty about future earnings and stock 
returns (e.g., Avramov et al. (2009), Barron and Stuerke (1998), Imhoff and Lobo (1992)).   
In this paper, we use implied volatilities from exchange traded options to examine the 
interaction between analysts’ forecast revisions and the market’s perception of uncertainty about 
firm value.  We ask three questions of interest to accounting researchers.  First, how does the 
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market react to information conveyed by forecast revisions, i.e., how do implied volatilities change 
in the days surrounding a forecast revision?  We examine this question in the context of two 
characteristics of the forecast revision; whether it conveys good or bad news and whether the 
dispersion of forecasts increases or decreases.  
Second, do analysts incorporate the information about implied volatilities into their 
forecast revisions?  Analysts gather and process information and then decide when to issue a 
revised forecast.  At the time of his/her forecast revision, the analyst can observe the change in 
implied volatility for the stock since the prior forecast revision (most likely by a different analyst).   
We reverse the first question by asking whether increases/decreases in the market’s perception of 
uncertainty about firm value affect the news conveyed by the analyst’s forecast revision. 
Third, a significant body of research has used the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts as a 
proxy for uncertainty about the value of the firm, future earnings, and future stock returns (e.g., 
Avramov et al. (2009), Barron and Stuerke (1998), Imhoff and Lobo (1992)).   With implied 
volatilities from exchange traded options reflecting a market transaction based metric for 
uncertainty, it is possible to test the extent to which dispersion of analysts’ forecasts reflects the 
market’s perception of uncertainty.   
Our work builds on prior accounting research that has examined how information provided 
by management and by analysts is used by market participants, particularly in setting prices.1    
They also conclude that the higher credibility and timeliness of articles in the business press result 
                                                          
1 More recent research has shifted the focus to risk effects.  Kothari et al. (2009), for example, investigated how 
Management Discussion &Analysis (MD&A) in the 10K report, analyst valuation reports, and articles in the business 
press affect firm risk as measured by future cost of capital, dispersion of analyst forecasts, and stock return volatility.  
Good (bad) news was hypothesized to reduce (increase) the risk metrics.  The credibility and timeliness of the three 
sources of information were also key parameters expected to impact the three firm risk factors.  Kothari et al. (2009) 
find that good (bad) news disclosures decrease (increase) the risk metrics. 
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in consistent and predictable reactions across the three risk metrics while the MD&A and analyst 
valuation reports affected only a subset of the risk metrics. 
Another recent study, Rogers et al. (2009), examined how management forecasts affected 
investor’s perceptions of firm risk.  Their study, like ours, used implied volatilities from exchange 
traded options2 as the risk metric. Our paper is different from Rogers et. al. (2009) in that we 
examine analyst forecast revisions, which are much more frequent and, therefore, timely sources 
of information to the market.  The same underlying information and uncertainty that influences 
implied volatility is also likely to cause analysts to revise their forecasts.  Market participants may, 
therefore, learn about the information environment from a forecast revision and trade in different 
markets which may, in turn, affect implied volatility.  Also, Rogers et al (2009) use one 
management forecast and therefore, the issues related to forecast dispersions cannot be addressed 
in their design.  As a result their design cannot address how the inherent uncertainty of the forecasts 
affect the market perception of risk.    
 Implied volatilities are an improved proxy for risk (compared to future cost of capital, 
dispersion of analyst forecasts, and stock return volatility) for three reasons.  First, finance theory 
suggests that implied volatilities are the market’s expectation of stock return volatility over the 
time to expiration of the option.  Second, implied volatilities are based on realized market 
transactions (as opposed to analysts’ perceptions) and third, changes are observable immediately 
following an event, such as the release of a forecast revision.  This permits a “short-window” 
analysis uncontaminated by past or future economic events that might influence the measurement 
of other risk metrics such as the cost of capital, the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts, and stock 
return volatility.   
                                                          
2 Available in the Option Metrics data base. 
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The Kothari et al. (2009) qualitative results that the content of the news affects risk 
attributes such as cost of capital are confirmed in Rogers et al. (2009) who find that the good (bad) 
news content of management forecasts results in decreases (increases) in implied volatility.3 Jones 
et.al. (2014) observe that implied volatility eventually reduces after the dividend announcement 
and declines after dividend initiation. These observations are consistent with the understanding 
that good news leads to a reduction of risk.   
Our results are consistent with all of these studies insofar as the changes in implied 
volatility on the days surrounding forecast revisions are negatively correlated with the nature of 
the news, i.e., good (bad) news forecasts result in decreases (increases) in implied volatility.  
Furthermore, we do not find evidence that analysts incorporate the information in implied volatility 
into their forecast revisions.  Specifically, we do not find that forecast revisions are more likely to 
be good (bad) news when implied volatility has decreased (increased) since the prior forecast 
revision for the firm.  Lastly, we also find evidence that changes in the dispersion of analysts’ 
forecasts are correlated with changes in implied volatility. 
We are also able to compare and contrast the results in our paper with those found in the 
Kothari et al. (2009) and Rogers et al. (2009) papers.  Kothari et al. (2009) posit that management, 
analysts and the business press have decreasing incentives to optimistically bias their disclosures 
and, therefore, have increasing credibility in the market.  They suggest that the market will discount 
the effect of disclosures based on the credibility of the source, i.e., news from a management 
disclosure will have a smaller effect on price than an equivalent disclosure by analysts.  We find a 
substantially different effect on uncertainty when comparing management and analyst earnings 
                                                          
3 Another example of information that may affect the uncertainty is a dividend announcement or initiation. Acker 
(1999) shows that a dividend announcement is associated with increases in risk and leads to an increase in implied 
volatility. 
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forecasts (recall that Kothari et al. (2009) investigate the MD&A in the 10K (not forecasts) and 
analyst valuation reports (not forecasts).  The magnitude of the change in implied volatilities 
during the days surrounding a management earnings forecast (Rogers et al. (2009)) is much larger 
than the change in implied volatilities surrounding analyst forecast revisions (our paper).  Our 
results indicate that the inferences about credibility and timeliness for the MD&A vs. the analyst 
valuation reports may not extend to earnings forecasts made by the two groups.  Finally, our 
multivariate examination of the correlation between dispersion of forecasts and implied volatility 
yields statistically significant results, although the R2’s are low.4   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides the background 
and hypotheses development.  Section 3 describes the sample selection procedures, defines the 
research methodology, and provides descriptive statistics.  Section 4 provides the discussion of 
results and Section 5 summarizes conclusions. 
2.  Background and Hypothesis Development 
 In this section we provide the background for our empirical predictions on the main 
research questions: (1) whether analysts’ forecast revisions impact the market’s perception of 
uncertainty about firm value, (2) whether analysts incorporate the observable information about 
implied volatilities into their forecast revisions, and (3) the degree to which analyst forecast 
dispersion, often used as a proxy for future stock return volatility, is correlated with implied 
volatilities from exchange traded options. 
2.1. Do Forecast Revisions Affect Implied Volatility? 
                                                          
4 Although a positive earnings surprise is the dominant factor in the market’s perception of firm performance, recent 
work by Rees and Twedt (2011) indicates that prior downward earnings guidance mitigates the favorable market 
response.  Relatedly, Yoo and Pae (2017) indicate that analysts attenuate the impact of negative earnings surprises 
by issuing more positive concurrent cash flow forecasts in order to maintain better relations with the firm’s 
management.    
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The first question is addressed using a short window, information content design, both in 
univariate format and multivariate regression.  Rogers et al. (2009) find that management forecasts, 
on average, increase uncertainty as measured by implied volatilities on the days surrounding the 
forecast.  We expect analyst forecast revisions to have the same effect.  Relatedly, we examine 
whether the magnitude (absolute value) of forecast revisions is correlated with the magnitude of 
changes in implied volatility. Thus our first hypothesis in alternative form becomes: 
Hypothesis 1A: Analyst forecast revisions increase the implied volatility of exchange-traded 
options around the date of the forecast. 
Hypothesis 1B: The absolute magnitude of forecast revisions is positively correlated with the 
absolute change in implied volatility of exchange-traded options around the date of the forecast. 
Kothari et al. (2009) posit a directional link between the nature of news and risk measures 
such as cost of capital. In an efficient market price changes are a result of new information about 
the magnitude and direction of cash flows and/or about the risk of the cash flows.  Even if 
information about the magnitude and risk are independent, smaller cash flows must be inherently 
more risky than larger cash flows (at minimum because bankruptcy risks are higher).  This 
hypothesis is tested in a CAPM framework by and Ball and Kothari (1989) who find that the cost 
of capital and return volatility are negatively associated with price changes and news.   
Both Kothari et al. (2009) and Rogers et al. (2009) posit the leverage effect as a reason why 
good vs. bad news affects risk metrics.  Price increases (decreases) associated with good (bad) 
news decrease (increase) the firm’s financial leverage, at least in market terms.5  Increases 
(decreases) in leverage make equity more (less) volatile and, therefore, to the extent “good news” 
leads to an increase in cash flow and consequently, to a lower leverage, it should be negatively 
                                                          
5 See Black (1976), Christie (1982), French et al. (1987), Campbell and Hentschel (1992) 
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correlated with uncertainty about firm value.  We, therefore, examine whether good (bad) news 
forecast revisions induce decreases (increases) in implied volatility during the seven-day period 
centered on the forecast revision.  This leads to our second hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: On average, good (bad) news forecast revisions result in decreases (increases) in 
implied volatility around the date of the forecast revision. 
A forecast revision, just as any disclosure, besides conveying good or a bad news, ought to 
increase the precision of investors’ beliefs about the parameters of the distribution of future 
payoffs, that may affect the forward-looking volatility of stock returns (Billings et. al, (2015) 
among others).   However, analysts’ forecasts embed within themselves another measure of 
uncertainty, their dispersion, that is absent in other disclosures. Prior research has used the 
dispersion of forecasts as a proxy for uncertainty (Kothari et al., 2009, Adut, Sen and Sinha 2014). 
Therefore, while the prior literature (Roger at. A. (2009), Billings et.al. (2015)) relates disclosure 
such as management forecast to implied volatility, their data and design cannot be used to directly 
correlate the dispersion of the disclosure (forecast) with the resultant uncertainty captured by the 
market6. Since the dispersions of the source news ought to be correlated with the end result, we 
test whether dispersion increasing (decreasing) forecast revisions lead to increases (decreases) in 
implied volatility during the days surrounding the forecast.   
The combination of the news and dispersion effects of a forecast revision suggests a 2 x 2 
matrix with four cells [(1) good news dispersion increasing, (2) good news dispersion decreasing, 
(3) bad news dispersion increasing, and (4) bad news dispersion decreasing].  Each cell has the 
potential to convey a different risk scenario affecting changes in implied volatility.  We select the 
                                                          
6 Tang et. al. (2014) relates the range of management earnings forecast with the Analysts Forecasts dispersion, and 
in spite of being a step in the right direction, a range by itself does not capture the variation that is done by the 
dispersion, which attempts to capture the second moment of the underlying distribution. 
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good news, dispersion decreasing and the bad news, dispersion increasing subset for potentially 
extreme increases and decreases in implied volatility. This discussion leads to our third hypothesis 
in alternative form about the combination of information content and forecast dispersion.   
Hypothesis3A: Dispersion reducing (increasing) forecast revisions result in decreases (increases) 
in implied volatilities around the date of the forecast.  
Hypothesis 3B: The combination good (bad) news, dispersion decreasing (increasing) forecast 
revisions result in greater decreases (increases) in implied volatility than all good (bad) news 
forecast revisions.    
2.2. Are Changes in Dispersion of Forecasts Correlated with Changes in Implied Volatility? 
Accounting researchers have used the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts as a proxy for 
uncertainty about the current value of the firm, the future performance of the firm (e.g., future 
earnings), and the future value of the firm (e.g., the volatility of future stock returns).  Therefore, 
if dispersion of forecasts is indeed a proxy for uncertainty, we would expect the change in 
dispersion from one forecast revision to the next one to be correlated with the change in implied 
volatility over the same period of time.  Thus, we get Hypothesis 4, stated in the alternate form. 
Hypothesis 4: Changes in dispersion of forecasts are positively correlated with changes in implied 
volatilities during the period between forecast revisions.  
2.3. Do Changes in Implied Volatility Affect Subsequent Forecast Revisions? 
Analysts seek out and create value relevant information and then choose the time to release 
it through their forecast revisions.  A long-standing question of interest to accounting researchers 
is whether analysts use all of the information at their disposal, e.g., price changes since the last 
forecast revision.  In our context, the question is whether analysts use the observable changes in 
implied volatilities during the time period between forecast revisions, and whether they interpret 
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a reduction (increase) in implied volatility as a signal of good (bad) news.  If analysts process the 
information in this manner, we would expect good (bad) news forecast revisions to be associated 
with a prior (between forecast) period decreases (increases) in implied volatilities.  If they do not 
use the information, we would not expect to see such an association.7 Hence Hypothesis 5 follows. 
Hypothesis 5: A decreases (increases) in implied volatilities during a time between forecast 
revision, leads to a good (bad) news forecast revision for the subsequent forecast.  
3. Experimental Design 
 In this section we detail the definitions of the variables used in the analysis.  First, all tests 
rely on the characteristics of the forecast revision.  These can best be described using Figure 1 for 
a hypothetical current forecast revision on April 22.  The prior forecast revision (usually but not 
necessarily by a different analyst) occurred on March 14.  Note that the characteristics of analysts’ 
forecasts for the firm (e.g., mean and dispersion) do not change in the intervening days.  We 
calculate the mean (AF) and standard deviation (σ) of analysts’ forecasts on each revision date.  
An increase (decrease) in the mean forecast is defined as good (bad) news.  The mean forecast on 
the current (prior) revision dates is labeled AFrevdate (AFpriordate) in the tables, respectively.  The 
change in the mean forecast is defined as the difference in the mean forecasts divided by the stock 
price at the prior revision date.   
 Implied volatilities are defined as the implied standard deviation of stock returns (ISD) 
from the Black-Scholes option pricing formula.  The OptionMetrics database adjusts the ISD to 
                                                          
7 Our timeline is carefully constructed to avoid endogeneity issues between forecast revisions and implied volatility, 
i.e., forecast revisions may affect implied volatility and implied volatility may affect forecast revisions.  This point is 
illustrated in Figure 2 which shows that the implied volatility (possibly) used by the analyst does not overlap with the 
date of the forecast revision, indeed, the forecast revision happens three days later.  A forecast revision may affect 
implied volatility because both incorporate the same underlying uncertainties and information.  This does not preclude 
the analyst from using all observable information, including implied volatilities. 
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reflect a standard time to expiration (30, 60, 91 . . . days).  We use % changes in ISD’s in our 
analysis. 
The first research question asks how the market reacts to characteristics of the forecast 
revision – the change in ISD is, therefore, measured from day -3 to day +3 relative to the current 
forecast revision.8,9  The second research question asks whether analysts incorporate the 
information about changes in implied volatilities into their forecasts.  This case is shown in Figure 
2.  An analyst can observe the change in implied volatility for the firm from the date of the prior 
forecast to the date just prior to his current forecast revision.  We chose day – 3 as the last date the 
analyst looks at implied volatility because of concern that volatilities might change through 
leakage of the forecast revision.  The third research question asks whether forecast dispersion is 
correlated with changes in implied volatility.  This situation is also shown in Figure 2.  In this case 
the change in implied volatility is measured on the days of the current and prior forecast revisions 
to coincide with the days on which forecast dispersion is measured. 
4. Data 
 Our sample consists of the intersection of (1) firms with implied volatilities of various 
durations in the OptionMetrics Standardized Options dataset for the time period from 1996 to 
2006,10 (2) firms with analyst forecasts in the detail IBES dataset, and (3) firms with stock prices 
and returns in the CRSP files.   
                                                          
8 Our experimental design is intended to capture the causality between forecast revisions and changes in implied 
volatility.  Specifically, the event window is narrow enough to preclude the occurrence of too many extraneous events 
of importance and the sample size is sufficiently large to average away the effects of such events, should they occur. 
9 We have replicated tables 6 through 8 using 11 day (days -5 to +5) and three day (days -1 to +1) event windows.  
Results are qualitatively similar to those reported in the paper for the seven day (days -3 to +3) event window.  Results 
are available upon request. 
10 We recognize that time span covered by OptionMetrics is dated, but versions with more recent data are not 
available to the authors. 
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Table 1 provides the basic data availability and screening procedures for options with 30 
days to maturity.  It shows that data availability on COMPUSTAT and CRSP reduce sample size 
by very little (~ 3.2%).  This is consistent with common knowledge that larger firms tend to have 
exchange traded options and COMPUSTAT and CRSP have more complete data on larger firms.  
Table 2 illustrates that there are more exchange traded options with short durations than long 
durations.  Table 3 provides descriptive statistics on the distribution of changes in implied volatility 
around forecast dates for options with durations ranging from 30 days to 730 days.  The 
distributions appear to be symmetrically distributed around the median.  The analyst following for 
sample firms ranges from a minimum of three (required to compute a dispersion of forecasts) to a 
maximum of 54 (with 25th percentile = 8 analysts and 75th percentile = 20 analysts).  Similarly, the 
25th percentile for the market value of equity is $1.1 billion and the 75th percentile is $10.9 billion. 
5. Discussion of Results 
 This section provides the results of the empirical analysis of the research questions raised 
in Section 2.  Several analyses not raised in the research questions were performed when 
appropriate for comparison to the Rogers et al. (2009) paper. 
5.1. Do Forecast Revisions Affect Implied Volatility? 
We first examine whether forecast revisions, on average, create or resolve uncertainty.  
Table 4 (Hypothesis 1A) reports changes in implied volatilities for options with various times to 
expiration during the seven days centered on forecast revision dates.  Average changes for all times 
to expiration are positive, indicating that analyst forecast revisions, like management forecasts 
(Rogers et al. (2009)) exacerbate uncertainty about firm value.  What is interesting, however, is 
that the magnitude of changes in implied volatilities is much greater for management forecasts 
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(average = 1.98%) than for analyst forecasts (average = 0.10% from Table 4).  It would appear 
that management forecasts have a much greater market impact than analyst forecasts.   
This may be explained by the following argument.  First, management has better 
information than analysts (as a group) about the prospects for the firm even though it may have 
less credibility with investors (Kothari et al. (2009)).  How that trades off in the impact on risk 
measures is an empirical question.  Second, each firm with exchange traded options has an average 
of 15 analysts (all forecasting the same thing) and only one management team.  Furthermore, the 
sheer number of analyst forecasts (~176,000) in our study is greater by almost an order of 
magnitude than the number of management forecasts (~21,600) in Rogers et al. (2009). This 
suggests that the effect of a single analyst forecast revision on implied volatility may be 
substantially smaller than a management forecast. Further, unlike the management forecasts, 
analyst forecasts are a two-dimensional information transfer in that the market must process the 
mean and the variance for a given income forecast. Therefore, it is plausible that the impact of just 
the mean of analysts’ forecasts may have a lesser impact.  
In Table 5 (Hypothesis 1B), we examine whether larger forecast revisions result in larger 
changes in implied volatilities.  We document a monotonic increase in absolute changes in implied 
volatilities across quintiles sorted by absolute magnitude of forecast revisions.  In fact, across 
different times to expiration, the average change in implied volatility for the smallest (largest) 
quintile of forecast revisions is 0.42% (11.08%).   
Table 6 (Hypothesis 2) examines the effect of one important forecast characteristic, i.e., the 
news (good vs bad) of the forecast revision, on changes in implied volatilities.  Consistent with 
Rogers et al. (2009) and Kothari et al. (2009), we find that good (bad) news forecasts are associated 
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with decreases (increases) in uncertainty.  Specifically, the average decrease (increase) in implied 
volatility for good (bad) news forecasts is -0.14% (+0.29%).   
Table 7 (Hypothesis 3A) examines whether changes in forecast dispersion are related to 
changes in implied volatilities.  The sample is divided into dispersion decreasing and dispersion 
increasing groups at the forecast revision dates.  While implied volatilities on average, increase for 
both groups, the increase is significantly smaller for the dispersion decreasing subset (0.11%) than 
for the dispersion increasing subset (0.24%).  We conclude from this univariate test that forecast 
dispersion may be a reasonable proxy for uncertainty about firm value.  We note, without 
explanation, that the difference in implied volatility for the two groups is not statistically 
significant for 30 day options. 
The prior two tables indicate that both the content of the forecast revision (news) and the 
change in dispersion resulting from the forecast revision are systematically related to changes in 
implied volatilities during the days surrounding a forecast revision.  This suggests that further 
splitting the sample into good news, dispersion decreasing forecasts and bad news, dispersion 
increasing forecasts may result in more pronounced differences in implied volatilities.  Table 8 
(Hypothesis 3B) reports that the decrease in implied volatility for the first group is -0.22% and the 
increase in implied volatility for the second group is +0.15%.  The difference in implied volatilities 
is 0.37% which is bigger than difference between dispersion decreasing/increasing groups (Table 
6: 0.24% and 0.11%) and also smaller that the difference between the good/bad news groups (Table 
7: 0.29% and -0.14%).  This may be due to the fact that news and changes in dispersion are 
correlated and not independent.  
We next examine the effect of the forecast, firm and market characteristics on changes in 
implied volatilities in a multivariate regression format.  Recall that in the univariate analyses, the 
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absolute magnitude of the forecast revision, the news (sign) of the forecast revision, and the change 
in dispersion of forecasts on the days surrounding a forecast revision were all individually 
associated with changes in implied volatilities.   In this analysis we begin with the news and the 
absolute magnitude of the forecast revision as explanatory variables for changes in implied 
volatilities and then sequentially add the change in dispersion of forecasts and two control 
variables (number of analysts as a proxy for the richness of the information environment and the 
change in the ISD Index (market-wide movements in implied volatilities).   
Table 9 (see the regression including all variables) documents that the sign of the news 
(good vs bad), the absolute magnitude of the news (magnitude of the forecast revision) and the 
change in dispersion of analysts’ forecasts are all statistically significant even when controlling 
for the richness of the information environment (number of analysts and the average frequency of 
analyst forecast revisions) and the market wide movements in implied volatility (log of ISD index).  
This is true for option expirations dates of 30, 60 and 91 days.  We infer from Tables 4 through 9 
that implied market volatility responds systematically to the release of analyst forecast revisions. 
5.2. Do Changes in Implied Volatility Affect Forecast Revisions? 
This section examines whether analysts incorporate the observable information about 
changes in implied volatilities into their forecasts.  Refer to Figure 2 and consider the following 
example.  Firm XYZ has 10 analysts following it.  One analyst issues a forecast revision on March 
14 resulting in a consensus forecast of $3.50 per share.  On April 22 (39 days later), another analyst 
issues a forecast revision that moves the consensus to $3.55 per share (good news).  The second 
analyst has the changes in implied volatilities over that 39 day period available to him/her and can 
incorporate that information into the forecast revision.  For example, if implied volatilities had 
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declined (increased) during that 39 day period, the analyst might be more likely to issue a good 
(bad) news forecast revision.   
Table 10 uses a logit regression where the sign of the news (good/bad) is the dependent 
variable and the change in implied volatility since the prior forecast revision is the primary 
independent variable.  The analysis is conducted for 30, 60, and 91 day options (panels A, B, and 
C).  The regression in the left part of each panel has just the change in implied volatility as the 
explanatory variable, while the regression in the right part of each panel adds the log of the number 
of analysts and the log of the change in market wide volatility as control variables.  The coefficient 
on changes in implied volatility is significant at conventional levels for 30 day options.  This is 
true for the univariate regression as well as the regression that includes the control variables.  
Coefficients in the 60 and 91 day options are not significant (with the exception of univariate 
regression for 60 day options where p = .048).  Coefficients across the three option durations are 
very consistent in magnitude, ranging from -0.0934 to -0.1053 across the six regressions.  Given 
the large sample size and the borderline statistical significance, we conclude that analysts do not 
put much weight on changes in implied volatility in their decision to issue an upward or downward 
forecast revision. 
5.3. Are Changes in Dispersion of Forecasts Correlated with Changes in Implied Volatility? 
Accounting researchers have long used the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts as a proxy for 
uncertainty about firm value.  The availability of ISD’s allows us to test whether there is agreement 
between the two metrics.  Table 11 (Hypothesis 4), therefore, examines whether changes in 
forecast dispersion are correlated with changes in implied volatilities during the period between 
forecast revisions.  Three regressions are performed with changes in dispersion as the dependent 
variable and (1) just changes in implied volatility as the independent variable, (2) the same 
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regression as in (1) with the sign of the news and the absolute magnitude of the forecast revision 
included as control variables, and (3) the same regression as in (2) plus the log of the number of 
analysts and the log of the ISD index added as control variables.  In all three regressions, the 
parameter on the change in implied volatility is stable and significant.  We conclude that changes 
in dispersion of analyst forecasts is a good proxy for market based changes in uncertainty about 
firm value. 
6. Conclusions 
 We ask three questions in this study.  First, does the market’s perception of uncertainty 
about firm value (proxied by implied volatilities derived from exchange traded options) change as 
a result of analysts’ forecast revisions?  We find support for this proposition using an event study 
methodology during the seven days surrounding and including each forecast revision date.  Like 
previous studies, we find that (1) forecast revisions, on average, increase uncertainty, (2) larger 
forecast revisions (absolute value) result in larger changes in uncertainty, (3) good (bad) news 
forecast revisions resolve (exacerbate) uncertainty, and (4) dispersion decreasing (increasing) 
forecast revisions resolve (exacerbate) uncertainty.  Univariate test and multivariate regressions 
confirm these results. 
 Second, we document that analysts do not appear to use changes in implied volatilities 
between forecast revisions to nudge their forecasts toward good or bad news.  The quality off 
analysts’ forecasts may be improved by the use of the information contained in the volatility of 
exchange traded options.  However, capital markets research using ISD’s is still relatively new.  
Useful information for market participants is limited at this time, but may be forthcoming in the 
future. 
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Third, we find that changes in forecast dispersion are a reasonable proxy for changes in 
implied volatility.  This is tested in a multivariate regression with multiple control variables.   
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Figure 1
Sample Timeline for Changes in Implied Volatiliy Around Forecast Revisions
14-Mar 25-Apr
AFpriordate
17-Apr 22-Apr
AFrevdate
AFpriordate = mean of all analysts' forecasts following the firm on March 14
AFrevdate   = mean of all analysts' forecasts following the firm on April 22
σrevdate - 3  = ISD for 30, 60, 91 . . .  day options on April 17 (3 trading days before the forecast revision)
σrevdate + 3 = ISD for 30, 60, 91 . . .  day options on April 25 (3 trading days after the forecast revision)
DISPpriordate DISPrevdateσrevdate - 3 σrevdate + 3
Change in dispersion of forecasts = DISPrevdate - DISPpriordate
DISPrevdate = standard deviation of analysts' forecasts on forecast revision date scaled by AFrevdate
DISPpriordate = standard deviation of analysts' forecasts on forecast revision date scaled by AFpriordate
Change in analysts' forecasts = (AFrevdate - AFpriordate) / Pricepriordate
Change in implied volatility    = ln(σrevdate + 3 / σrevdate - 3) 
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Figure 2
Sample Timeline for Changes in Implied Volatiliy Between Forecast Revisions
14-Mar
AFpriordate AFrevdate
22-Apr17-Apr
DISPpriordate = standard deviation of analysts' forecasts on forecast revision date scaled by AFpriordate
Change in analysts' forecasts = (AFrevdate - AFpriordate) / Pricepriordate
Change in implied volatility = ln(σrevdate - 3 / σpriordate) 
Change in dispersion of forecasts = DISPrevdate - DISPpriordate
σrevdate - 3
DISPpriordate DISPrevdate
σpriordate σrevdate
AFpriordate = mean of all analysts' forecasts following the firm on March 14
AFrevdate = mean of all analysts' forecasts following the firm on April 22
σpriordate = ISD for 30, 60, 91 . . .  day options on March 14
σrevdate - 3 = ISD for 30, 60, 91 . . .  day options on April 17 (3 trading days prior to the forecast revision)
DISPrevdate = standard deviation of analysts' forecasts on forecast revision date scaled by AFrevdate
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Table 1 
Sample Availability and Screening Procedures* 
 
 
 
    
   *30 day options 
   
              
Table 2 
Number of Forecast Revision Dates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
#Observations 
Initial sample from IBES 
   
181,662 
Less Missing COMPUSTAT data 
  
          (1,487) 
Less Missing CRSP data 
   
          (4,343) 
Remaining firm year observations 
  
175,832 
 
Option Duration 
 
# Observations   
30 days 175,832 
60 days 176,125 
91 days 176,633 
122 days 176,416 
152 days 172,900 
182 days 131,316 
273 days 67,787 
365 days 67,501 
547 days 66,565 
730 days 38,680 
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Table 3 
Changes in Implied Volatilities on Forecast Revision Dates 
 
Option 
Duration 
#Observations Mean 25th 
Percentile 
Median 75th 
Percentile 
  30 days 175,832 0.10% -4.96% -0.09% 4.90% 
  60 days 176,125 0.11% -3.87% -0.22% 3.61% 
  91 days 176,633 0.17% -3.05% -0.17% 2.86% 
122 days 176,416 0.16% -2.70% -0.17% 2.53% 
152 days 172,900 0.14% -2.50% -0.19% 2.28% 
182 days 131,316 0.15% -2.33% 0.15% 2.16% 
273 days 67,787 0.04% -2.27% -0.18% 2.03% 
365 days 67,501 0.03% -1.92% -0.12% 1.73% 
547 days 66,565 0.02% -1.65% -0.10% 1.44% 
730 days 38,680 0.06% -1.43% -0.07% 1.27% 
News 183,194 0.446 0.000 0.000 1.000 
AbsNews 183,194 0.031 0.003 0.008 0.025 
∆Disp 183,194 0.163 0.029 0.069 0.176 
AnFollowing 183,194 14.705 8.000 13.000 20.000 
ISD_Index 183,194 1.003 0.928 0.991 1.065 
MVE 182,708 14,158 10,833 3,395 10,943 
Leverage 182,651 0.2103 0.0495 0.1798 0.3174 
BM ratio 182,680 10.1338 0.2132 0.3655 0.5464 
Frequency 183,194 5.9162 4.2500 5.5111 7.1776 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics for changes in implied volatility around forecast revision dates by quartiles.  The absolute change in mean analysts’ forecasts is scaled by 
the stock price on the prior revision date.   Implied_Volatility_[30,60,91,122,152,273, 365,547, 730] is the ln(σRevdate+3 /σRevdate-3)  which represents the  natural logarithm of the ratio 
of the post-forecast Implied Volatility (three trading days after the analysts’ forecast revision) to the pre-forecast Implied Volatility (three trading days  before the analysts’ forecast 
revision).     News is 1 if mean analyst forecast is greater than the previous forecast and zero otherwise. AbsNews is the absolute value of the magnitude of the difference between 
the mean analyst forecast and the previous mean analyst forecast scaled by price.   ∆Disp is the change in dispersion between the revision date and the previous revision date.  
AnFollowing is the natural logarithm of the number of analysts following a firm.  ISD_Index is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the level of the Chicago Board Options Exchange 
Volatility Index on the post- forecast date scaled by the value of the index on the pre-forecast.  Frequency is the average revision frequency of analysts who follow firm i in year t.  
MVE is the market value of equity prior to forecast issuance.  Leverage is the ratio of long term debt to total assets.  BM ratio is the ratio of the firm’s shareholders’ equity to market 
value prior to the forecast issuance. 
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Table 4 
Changes in Implied Volatility Around Forecast Revision Dates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics for changes in implied volatility around forecast revision dates.  Implied_Volatility_[30,60,91,122,152,273, 365,547, 730] is the ln(σRevdate+3 
/σRevdate-3)  )  which represents the  natural logarithm of the ratio of the post-forecast Implied Volatility (three trading days after the analysts’ forecast revision) to the pre-forecast 
Implied Volatility (three trading days  before the analysts’ forecast revision).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Option 
Duration (days) 
N ln(σrevdate + 3/σrevdate - 3) t-statistic 
30 175,832  0.0010 3.69  
60 176,125  0.0011 5.54  
91 176,633  0.0017 9.70  
122 176,416  0.0016 9.88  
152 172,900  0.0014 9.09  
182 131,316  0.0015 9.12  
273 67,787  0.0004 2.16  
365 67,501  0.0003 1.66  
547 66,565  0.0002 1.33  
730 38,680  0.0006 2.65  
Average 
 
0.0010 
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Table 5 
Absolute Changes in Implied Volatility and Forecast Revisions Around Forecast Revision Dates 
 
Option 
Duration (days) 
 N Q1* Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5* 
30 175,832  0.0081 0.0261 0.0498 0.0864 0.1955 
60 176,125  0.0062 0.0200 0.0379 0.0659 0.1528 
91 176,633  0.0048 0.0155 0.0299 0.0528 0.1280 
122 176,416  0.0042 0.0136 0.0265 0.0474 0.1175 
152 172,900  0.0038 0.0124 0.0243 0.0437 0.1106 
182 131,316  0.0036 0.0117 0.0228 0.0408 0.1031 
273 67,787  0.0036 0.0116 0.0219 0.0373 0.0867 
365 67,501  0.0030 0.0097 0.0185 0.0323 0.0774 
547 66,565  0.0024 0.0080 0.0157 0.0279 0.0696 
730 38,680  0.0020 0.0069 0.0137 0.0249 0.0669 
Average 
 
0.0042 0.0135 0.0261 0.0459 0.1108 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics for changes in implied volatility around forecast revision dates by quintiles.  The quintiles are based on the absolute change in mean analysts’ 
forecasts between the revision date and the prior revision date.  The absolute change in mean analysts’ forecasts is scaled by the stock price on the prior revision date.   
Implied_Volatility_[30,60,91,122,152,273, 365,547, 730] is the ln(σRevdate+3 /σRevdate-3)  which represents the  natural logarithm of the ratio of the post-forecast Implied Volatility 
(three trading days after the analysts’ forecast revision) to the pre-forecast Implied Volatility (three trading days  before the analysts’ forecast revision).  
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Table 6 
Changes in Implied Volatility Around Forecast Revision Dates:  Dispersion Increasing vs. Dispersion Decreasing 
  
Dispersion Decreasing Dispersion Increasing t-statistic 
Option 
Duration 
N ln(σrevdate + 3/σrevdate - 3) N ln(σrevdate + 3/σrevdate - 3) Difference 
30 94,949 0.0026 75,660 0.0023 0.53 
60 94,732 0.0017 75,438 0.0028 -2.41 
91 94,489 0.0017 75,225 0.0035 -4.90 
122 94,232 0.0015 74,990 0.0035 -5.79 
152 92,100 0.0012 73,249 0.0033 -6.27 
182 70,564 0.0013 55,335 0.0033 -5.82 
273 37,809 0.0003 28,155 0.0018 -3.78 
365 37,613 0.0000 28,023 0.0014 -3.72 
547 37,089 0.0000 27,514 0.0012 -3.27 
730 22,247 0.0003 16,490 0.0013 -2.30 
Average 
 
0.0011 
 
0.0024 
 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics for changes in implied volatility around forecast revision dates partitioned on dispersion around analysts’ forecasts. .  A forecast is coded 
dispersion decreasing if the standard deviation of the mean analysts’ forecast declines from the prior revision date.  A forecast is coded  dispersion increasing if the standard deviation 
of the mean analysts’ forecast increases from the prior revision date. Implied_Volatility_[30,60,91,122,152,273, 365,547, 730] is the ln(σRevdate+3 /σRevdate-3)  which represents the  
natural logarithm of the ratio of the post-forecast Implied Volatility (three trading days after the analysts’ forecast revision) to the pre-forecast Implied Volatility (three trading days  
before the analysts’ forecast revision).  
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Table 7 
Changes in Implied Volatility Around Forecast Revision Dates:  Good vs. Bad News 
  
Good News Forecast Revisions Bad News Forecast Revisions t-statistic 
Option 
Duration (days) 
N ln(σrevdate + 3/σrevdate - 3) N ln(σrevdate + 3/σrevdate - 3) Difference 
30 79,170  (0.0016) 96,662  0.0031  9.04  
60 79,211  (0.0016) 96,914  0.0034  12.14  
91 79,316  (0.0012) 97,317  0.0040  15.20  
122 79,206  (0.0012) 97,210  0.0039  16.06  
152 77,743  (0.0012) 95,157  0.0036  15.71  
182 59,219  (0.0010) 72,097  0.0036  13.90  
273 31,249  (0.0014) 36,538  0.0020  8.97  
365 31,076  (0.0013) 36,425  0.0017  8.63  
547 30,687  (0.0013) 35,878  0.0015  8.72  
730 15,500  (0.0015) 21,180  0.0023  8.85  
Average   (0.0014) 
 
0.0029  
 
This table provides descriptive statistics for changes in implied volatility around forecast revision dates partitioned on type of news.  A forecast is coded good news if the analysts’ 
forecast exceeds the analysts’ forecast on the previous revision date.   A forecast is coded bad news if the analysts’ forecast on the previous revision date exceeds the current analysts’ 
forecast.  Implied_Volatility_[30,60,91,122,152,273, 365,547, 730] is the ln(σRevdate+3 /σRevdate-3)  which represents the  natural logarithm of the ratio of the post-forecast Implied 
Volatility (three trading days after the analysts’ forecast revision) to the pre-forecast Implied Volatility (three trading days  before the analysts’ forecast revision).  
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Table 8 
Changes in Implied Volatility Around Forecast Revision Dates 
Good News and Dispersion Decreasing vs. Bad News and Dispersion Increasing 
  
Good News and Dispersion 
Decreasing 
Bad News and Dispersion Increasing t-statistic 
Option 
Duration (days) 
N ln(σrevdate + 3/σrevdate - 3) N ln(σrevdate + 3/σrevdate - 3) Difference 
30 34,739  (0.0039) 51,773  0.0021  (5.47) 
60 34,769  (0.0032) 51,861  0.0019  (9.45) 
91 34,810  (0.0022) 52,030  0.0022  (13.48) 
122 34,753  (0.0020) 51,958  0.0021  (14.65) 
152 34,124  (0.0019) 50,899  0.0017  (14.99) 
182 25,691  (0.0015) 38,850  0.0018  (13.40) 
273 13,077  (0.0020) 20,395  0.0006  (8.81) 
365 13,003  (0.0017) 20,332  0.0006  (8.43) 
547 12,833  (0.0016) 20,075  0.0006  (8.33) 
730 7,242  (0.0020) 11,941  0.0013  (7.68) 
Average 
 
(0.0022) 
 
0.0015  
 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics for changes in implied volatility around forecast revision dates partitioned on type of news and dispersion.  A forecast is coded good news 
and dispersion decreasing if the analysts’ forecast exceeds the analysts’ forecast on the previous revision date and the standard deviation of the mean analysts’ forecast on the revision 
date is less than on the previous revision date.  A forecast is coded bad news and dispersion increasing if the analysts’ forecast on the previous revision date exceeds the current 
analysts’ forecast and the standard deviation of the mean analysts’ forecast on the revision date is greater than on the previous revision date. Implied_Volatility_[30,60,91,122,152,273, 
365,547, 730] is the ln(σRevdate+3 /σRevdate-3)  which represents the  natural logarithm of the ratio of the post-forecast Implied Volatility (three trading days after the analysts’ forecast 
revision) to the pre-forecast Implied Volatility (three trading days  before the analysts’ forecast revision).  
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Table 9 
Multivariate Analysis of Changes in Implied Volatility Around Forecast Revision Dates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: 60 Day Options 
     
Panel A: 30 Day Options 
     
Independent variables parameter t-statistic parameter t-statistic parameter t-statistic 
Intercept 0.0045  12.19  0.0058  15.54  0.0019  4.68  
News (0.0048) (8.82) (0.0046) (8.38) (0.0046) (8.60) 
AbsNews 0.1257  2.39  0.2606  4.14  0.0626  3.27  
ΔDISP     0.0064  2.16  0.0069  2.36  
An_Following         (0.0027) (4.31) 
ISD_Index         0.2012  84.08  
Ln Frequency     0.0030 4.11 
MVE     0.0001 0.25 
Leverage     0.0015 1.02 
BM ratio     0.0000 0.92 
Number observations 170,609  162,501  161,385  
Adjusted R2 0.05% 0.06% 4.27% 
30 
 
Independent variables parameter t-statistic parameter t-statistic parameter t-statistic 
Intercept 0.0043  14.75  0.0050  16.68  0.0103  6.78  
News (0.0053) (12.28) (0.0053) (12.02) (0.0052) (12.02) 
AbsNews 0.1826  4.31  0.2902  5.71  0.2348  4.64  
ΔDISP     0.0065  2.72  0.0070  2.97  
An_Following         (0.0022) (4.45) 
ISD_Index         0.1527  79.39  
Ln Frequency     0.0020 3.36 
MVE     (0.0002) (1.04) 
Leverage     0.0002 0.19 
BM ratio     0.0000 1.41 
Number observations 170,170  162,167  161,017  
Adjusted R2 0.10% 0.12% 3.91% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: 91 Day Options 
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Independent variables parameter t-statistic parameter t-statistic parameter t-statistic 
Intercept 0.0048  19.21  0.0051  20.42  0.0104  8.15  
News (0.0057) (15.56) (0.0057) (15.23) (0.0056) (15.24) 
AbsNews 0.2415  6.77  0.3336  7.77  0.2902  6.79  
ΔDISP     0.0076  3.79  0.0080  4.05  
An_Following         (0.0014) (3.26) 
ISD_Index         0.1295  79.93  
Ln Frequency     0.0012 2.45 
MVE     (0.0003) (2.23) 
Leverage     (0.0005) (0.48) 
BM ratio     (0.0000) (2.66) 
Number observations 169,714  161,730  160,627  
Adjusted R2 0.17% 0.20% 4.04% 
 
*This table reports the multivariate regression results for the change in implied volatility surrounding an analyst’s forecast.  The sample includes analysts’ forecasts made between 
1996 and 2006.  The dependent variable in each panel is Implied_Volatility_[30,60,91] which is measured as  the ln(σRevdate+3 /σRevdate-3)  which represents the  natural logarithm of 
the ratio of the post-forecast Implied Volatility (three trading days after the analysts’ forecast revision) to the pre-forecast Implied Volatility (three trading days  before the analysts’ 
forecast revision).  
News is 1 if mean analyst forecast is greater than the previous forecast and zero otherwise. AbsNews is the absolute value of the magnitude of the difference between the mean analyst 
forecast and the previous mean analyst forecast scaled by price.   ∆Disp is the change in dispersion between the revision date and the previous revision date.  
 An_Following is the natural logarithm of the number of analysts following a firm.  ISD_Index is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the level of the Chicago Board Options Exchange 
Volatility Index on the post- forecast date scaled by the value of the index on the pre-forecast.  
***, **,* indicate that the statistic is statistically different from 0 at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level (two tailed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10 
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Multivariate Analysis of Changes in Implied Volatility and News in Forecast Revisions 
 
Panel A: 30 Day Options 
 
Independent variables Parameter Wald Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq Parameter Wald Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept (0.2113) 1829.56  0.000  (0.2941) 237.59  0.000 
ln(σrevdate/σpriordate)  (0.1004) 5.18  0.023  (0.0953) 4.50  0.034 
An_Following       0.0321  21.25  0.000 
ISD_Index       0.0730  2.65  0.104 
Number observations 165,762  
 
161,815  
 
Log Likelihood 5.19 
 
28.80 
 
 
Panel B: 60 Day Options 
 
Independent variables Parameter Wald Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq Parameter Wald Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept (0.2133) 1,864.670  0.000  (0.2955) 239.783  0.000  
ln(σrevdate/σpriordate)  (0.1053) 3.916  0.048  (0.0971) 3.214  0.073  
An_Following       0.0319  20.962  0.000  
ISD_Index       0.0749  2.794  0.095  
Number observations 165,868  
 
161,900  
 
Log Likelihood 3.92  
 
27.33  
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Panel C: 91 Day Options 
 
Independent variables Parameter Wald Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq Parameter Wald Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept (0.2159) 1,912.14  0.000  (0.2999) 247.70  0.000  
ln(σrevdate/σpriordate)  (0.1007) 2.77  0.096  (0.0934) 2.30  0.130  
An_Following       0.0326  21.93  0.000  
ISD_Index       0.0736  2.70  0.100  
Number observations 166,100  
 
162,109  
 
Log Likelihood 2.78  
 
27.26  
 
 
*This table reports the logit regression results for the change in news surrounding an analyst’s forecast.  The sample includes analysts’ forecasts made between 1996 and 2006.  The 
dependent variable in each panel is News which is measured as 1 if the mean analyst forecast is greater than the previous forecast and zero otherwise.  The ln(σRevdate+3 /σRevdate-3)  
represents the  natural logarithm of the ratio of the post-forecast Implied Volatility (3 trading days after the analysts’ forecasts) to the pre-forecast Implied Volatility (3 trading days  
before the analysts’ forecasts).  An_Following is the natural logarithm of the number of analysts following a firm.  ISD_Index is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the level of the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index on the post- forecast date scaled by the value of the index on the pre-forecast.  
***, **,* indicate that the statistic is statistically different from 0 at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level (two tailed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
 
 
 
Regression ln(DISPrevdate/DISPpriordate) = α + β1signnews + β2absnews + β3log#analysts + β4logISDindex + β4ln(σrevdate/σpriordate)
Independent variables parameter t-statistic parameter t-statistic parameter t-statistic
intercept 0.0427 42.22 0.0437 31.79 (0.0747) 18.18 
ln(σrevdate/σpriordate) 0.0637 3.48 0.0622 3.43 0.0667 3.65 
signnews (0.0259) (12.81) (0.0258) (12.71)
absnews 11.0277 46.11 13.3606 49.83
log#analysts (0.0122) (8.51)
logISDindex (0.0132) (1.45)
number observations
adjusted R2
Table 11
Multivariate Analysis of Changes in Implied Volatility and Dispersion of Analysts' Forecasts
155,872 155,872 152,274
Change in implied volatility = ln(σrevdate / σpriordate) as shown in Figure 1 timeline
signnews = 0 if bad; signnews = 1 if good
absnews = ABS[(AFrevdate - AFpriordate) / Pricepriordate]
log#analysts = natural log of number of analysts following the firm
logISDindex = natural log of the market change in implied volatility
0.01% 1.48% 1.88%
Panel A: 30 Day Options
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Independent variables parameter t-statistic parameter t-statistic parameter t-statistic
intercept 0.0432 42.58 0.0440 31.96 0.0748 18.19 
ln(σrevdate/σpriordate) 0.1300 5.51 0.1276 5.45 0.1206 5.12 
signnews (0.0266) (13.11) (0.0264) (13.00)
absnews 11.4803 47.85 13.9135 51.72
log#analysts (0.0122) (8.48)
logISDindex (0.0148) (1.63)
number observations
adjusted R2
Independent variables parameter t-statistic parameter t-statistic parameter t-statistic
intercept 0.0435 42.82 0.0443 32.19 0.0749 18.24 
ln(σrevdate/σpriordate) 0.1969 6.75 0.1986 6.87 0.1895 6.51 
signnews (0.0269) (13.28) (0.0266) (13.09)
absnews 11.5380 48.36 14.0031 52.32
log#analysts (0.0122) (8.48)
logISDindex (0.0172) (1.89)
number observations
adjusted R2
Panel B: 60 Day Options
156,172 156,172 152,563
0.02% 1.60% 2.02%
Panel C: 91 Day Options
0.03% 1.64% 2.07%
156,539 156,539 152,908
